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E
arnings inequality has increased dramatically in the United States
over the last decade and a half. Take, for exalnple, average weekly
earnings for adults who work full-time (Figure 1). The U.S.
Department of Labor (1994) has calculated that in 1979, a man at the 90th
percentile of the wage distribution earned 3.2 times as much as a man
at the 10th percentile. In 1992, a man at the 90th percentile earned 4.1
times as much. For women, the disparity increased from 3.1 to 3.7 over
this same time period. Men at the bottom of the earnings distribution fell
behind not only in relative but also in absolute terms, as average earnings
for all full-time male earners fell by about 3 percent from 1979 to 1992.
For women, average earnings increased by about 15 percent, so the rise in
inequality was less likely to be associated with declining real earnings.
While these particular calculations focus on only two points in the income
distribution, the conclusion that inequality has risen markedly over the
past decade and a half is supported by a large body of evidenceA
Earnings inequality has risen along various dimensions. Highly
educated workers have gained relative to less educated workers. Expe-
rienced workers have earned increasingly more than inexperienced
workers. And pay for similarly educated workers with similar length
of experience has become more unequal. The only significant contrary
trend is that the earnings of women have become more similar to those of
men.2 Recent evidence also shows that the increase in inequality during
the 1980s was greater in the United States than abroad, and that the
distribution of earnings here is much more dispersed than in other
industrialized countries.
Much of the literature on earnings inequality was reviewed in a
landmark survey by Frank Levy and Richard Murnane (1992). The
current paper provides an overview of our present knowledge, concen-
trating for the most part on contributions since the publication of the
Levy-Murnane study. It summarizes explanations for trends in inequality
by educational attainment, by experience, within education-experienceFigure 1
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1994).
categories, and in general. A remarkably diverse array
of economic factors (rather than a single dominant
force) have caused the rise in earnings inequality in
the United States. And although the rising education
wage premium has received considerably more atten-
tion than the other aspects of inequality, new evidence
suggests that growing inequality is traceable at least as
much to other aspects of work skills.
This survey briefly examines the sig~ificance of
two refinements to the measure of earnings--the role
of unemployment and underemployment on the
one hand, and the role of earnings variability on the
other. Individuals with a low earnings capacity are
increasingly likely to be out of work or working fewer
hours, relative to those with a high earnings capacity.
Therefore the trend toward greater earnings inequal-
ity looks more pronounced when one takes account
of persons who work less than full-time or less than
year-round.
The paper assesses how additional social and
political influences have interacted with labor markets
in determining inequality. Changes in taxes and trans-
~ For a comparison of alternative measures, see, for example,
Karoly (1993).
2 See Blau and Kahn (1994). Bradbury (1996) finds that inequal-
ity rose for men and women combh~ed during the 1980s, despite the
growing similarity in the earnings of men and women who worked
full-time and year-round.
fers have served to aggravate earnh~gs disparities in
the United States over the last decade and a half, as
has the increased prevalence of single-parent families.
The paper concludes with some observations on past
and future research themes.
Changing Returns to Education
The earnings of college graduates and non-college
graduates diverged sharply in the 1980s and early
1990s, after showing little relative change during the
1970s (Figure 2). According to the U.S. Department
of Labor (1994), between 1979 and 1992, real earnings
of full-time year-round male workers rose 5.2 percent
for those with a college degree, while failing for those
with less education. In 1992, male college graduates
earned 74 percent more than high school graduates
and 133 percent more than high school dropouts. In
1979, these differentials had been only 37 and 70
percent, respectively. The premium paid for education
also rose for women during the 1980s and early 1990s,
although all categories of full-time women workers
except ttigh school dropouts experienced at least some
increase in real earnings. As noted in Levy and Mur-
nane (1992), these trends have been explained by a
combination of ongoing increases in demand for col-
Figure 2
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor {1994). Annual figures computed for
year-round, full-time workers.
12 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewlege-educated workers and shifting rates of growth of
different grottps in the labor force.
The Supply of Highly Educated l/Vorkers
In the United States, the supply of college-edu-
cated workers slowed in the 1980s as compared to the
1970s, thereby helping to boost the return to higher
education. This swing in the rate of increase in the
number of college graduates was largely the result of
demographic influences, as most of the baby boom
generation came of age in the 1970s. hnmigration
patterns also played a role in changing the educational
composition of the work force. Borjas (1995) reports
that in 1990, nearly a quarter of high school dropouts
in the United States were foreign-born, compared to
only about one-eighth in 1980.3
Variation in the supply of labor also has been
helpful in explaining international differences in the
relative earnings of college graduates and non-college
graduates. For example, slower increases in the supply
The education of the average
American worker increased from
about 9 years in 1940 to about
13 years in 1990, while the
returns to education increased.
of college graduates during the 1980s contributed to
higher education-related earxzings differentials in the
United Kingdom and Japan (Katz, Loveman, and
Blanchflower 1995). On the other hand, a greater
expansion in the supply of college graduates in Can-
ada helps to explain a more modest rise in educational
earnings differentials, as compared with the United
States.
An important question looking forward is
whether the current large premktm for college-edu-
cated workers will prompt higher college enrolhnents,
thereby diminishing the premium in the future. A
recent paper by Mincer (1994) finds that educational
attainment does respond to wages, and that this
response will mitigate the trend toward higher wage
premia for college-educated workers. Mincer con-
cludes, however, that the premium is not likely to fall
from its current level. For one thing, the demand for
college-educated labor is likely to keep rising. More-
over, "lags in the educational pipeline, grooving costs
[of education], and perverse demographics represent
delays and impediments to timely supply effects."
Mincer also notes that the recent poor performance of
elementary and secondary school students, as mea-
sured by the high proportion with poor reading and
mathematics skills, may represent a bottleneck for the
supply adjustment. John Bishop’s paper for this sym-
posium further examines how demand and supply
responses are likely to influence the wage premium
for college-educated workers.
The Demand for Highly Educated Workers
Demand for more highly educated workers has
been increasing for many years. The edttcation of the
average American worker increased from about 9
years in 1940 to about 13 years in 1990, while the
returns to education increased (Murphy and Welch
1993c).4 The Levy-Murnane survey noted that "there
is a consensus on the hnportance of shifts in relative
demand, and there is no shortage of potential factors
to account for the demand shifts. But to date we have
an incomplete picture of the relative importance of
these factors." A vigorous debate on this topic con-
tinues.
Several hypotheses have emerged concerning de-
mand shifts. The first explanation is that the mix of
jobs has changed because industries such as manufac-
turing are a less important part of the economy than
they once were, while service-producing sectors have
increased in importance. Recent studies appear to be
in agreement that the growing inequality between
highly educated workers and others is due in part to
a changing industrial structm’e. However, they also
indicate that growing inequality is a phenomenon
common to many ind~tstries, and therefore industrial
mix cannot be the dominant factor in explaining
trends in inequality.
3 Immigration may also help to explain different wage trends in
regions within the United States. Topel (1994) found that those parts
of the country with the greatest increase in wage inequality were
those with the smallest improvements in labor-force qnality. In
particular, he indicated that immigration of low-level Asian and
Hispanic workers reduced the wages for non-immigrant ~vorkers in
the West by about 10 percent. However, Topel measured labor
quality according to the distribution of workers by wage categories,
which would take account of other factors in addition to education
levels.
~ Murphy and Welch estimate that increases in the returns to
education h~ the 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s more than offset decreases
in the 1940s and 1970s.
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has caused the wages of less educated workers to fall,
as the United States competes with countries where
wages are much lower. Although some studies have
found evidence indicating that international competi-
tion is an important explanation for growing inequal-
ity, the literature on the effects of trade is particularly
contentious.
A third explanation is non-neutral technological
change. The argument is that American industry has
invested in technologies that reduce the demand for
low-end workers, wltile increasing the productivity
(and wages) of high-end workers. This hypothesis
finds support in correlations between the extent of
investment in computers and other high-technology
Several hypotheses have emerged
concerning the demand for more
highly educated workers: a
changing industrial structure,
international trade, and non-
neutral technological change.
equipment by an industry, on the one hand, and the
growth in inequality in its wage structure on the other.
This hypothesis is appealing in that it potentially can
explain earnings trends across a wide spectrum of
industries.
The remainder of this section briefly reviews
some of the recent studies of the shifting demand for
highly educated workers. It divides the literature into
studies of industrial 1nix, international competition,
and technological change; studies dealing with more
than one theme also are noted under these headings.
h~dustriaI mix. Two recent studies decompose the
increased demand for education into "between indus-
try" and "within industry" effects. Murphy and
Welch (1993a) find that only 19 percent of the in-
creased demand for highly educated workers between
1968 and 1990 was due to the growing importance of
industries such as professional services, finance, and
education that traditionally employ a relatively high
proportion of college graduates and to the shrinkage
of industries such as agriculture, mining, and low- and
medium-skilled manufacturing that employ a rela-
tively low proportion. The remaining 81 percent was
due to higher demand for college-educated workers
among industries across the board.
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) perform a
similar decomposition within manufacturing and also
attempt to explain the between- and within-industry
shifts. They estimate that less than one-third of the
shift in employment from production (that is, less
educated) to nonproduction (more highly educated)
workers during the 1980s can be accounted for by
shifting employment across industries, and that these
industrial shifts in turn are attributable largely to
changes in defense-related demand and international
trade. Berman, Bound, and Griliches find that the
degree of shift toward nonproduction workers within
industries was correlated with industry investment in
computers and expenditures on research and devel-
opment. The authors interpret this latter finding as
indicative of the role of non-neutral technological
change in causing rising inequality.
Several studies examine the role of industrial
structure for middle- and lower-earners. Jul~m (1994)
notes that the 1980s were distinguished from the
previous four decades by the contraction of industries
and occupations that predominantly employ moder-
ately educated males. Declining opportunities in the
middle of the earnings distribution tended to increase
the competition for low-wage jobs. In cross-state re-
gressions, Juhn finds that the decline in the manufac-
turing sector had an effect on inequality precisely
because that is where many moderately educated
male workers have traditionally worked.
Acs and Danziger (1993) study men with earnings
below a level needed to keep a family of four out of
poverty. They conclude that the change in industrial
structure during the 1980s had little effect on the
earnings of white men in this category. Black men, on
the other hand, were adversely affected by the loss of
opportunities in manufacturing and in lower-paid
h~dustries. The shifts in industrial structure more than
offset the benefit of higher educational attainment for
black men.
Hutchens (1993) compares paths to success for 18-
and 19-year-old men without a high school diploma in
1966 and 1979. He finds that the nature of jobs within
certain key industries and occupations changed over
time. The earlier cohort could rely on construction and
clerical work to provide incomes that would keep
them out of poverty; these types of jobs provided less
attractive earnings for the later cohort.
Looking forward, the industrial mix of jobs is
expected to continue to change. The U.S. Department
of Labor projects that service-producing sectors will
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2005, as manufacturing and mining jobs continue to
disappear and construction jobs grow only modestly
(U.S. Department of Labor 1994). Whatever the effects
of a changing job mix in the past, however, one recent
study suggests that further changes may have only a
negligible effect on earnings inequality. Schweitzer
and Dupuy (1995) examine the distribution of earn-
ings in the goods-producing and service-producing
sectors for full-time workers between 1969 and 1993.
They find that the earnings distributions in these two
sectors have been converging since 1980 and are now
quite similar.
International competition. Among the studies most
forcefully setting out a substantial role for interna-
tional trade are Borjas and Ramey (1994a, 1994b) and
Wood (1994). Borjas and Ramey find that U.S. durable
goods manufacturing industries involved in interna-
tional trade traditionally have been more highly con-
centrated and have paid higher wages (adjusting for
observable characteristics of workers) than other in-
dustries. Increased competition from imports since
the early 1980s lowered the rents earned in these
industries as well as the wage bill paid to workers. The
decrease in employment opportunities, in turn, has
forced more workers into competitive sectors, which
has pushed average wages down. Borjas and Ramey
examine the ratio of earnings of college graduates to
less educated workers, comparing it with a list of
potential explanatory variables. Using cointegration
analysis for the period 1963-88, they show that the
only variable that consistently shares the same long-
term trend with the wage inequality series is the
durable goods trade deficit as a percentage of GDP.
(The level of research and development expenditures
per worker appears in a graphical comparison to be
correlated with wage inequality, but does not pass
muster in a formal statistical test.)
Wood performs a detailed analysis of the eco-
nomic effects of North-South (that is, developed coun-
try-developing country) trade. He concludes that in-
creased trade with developing countries is the main
cause of the relative shift in demand for more
"skilled" (that is, educated) labor in the developed
countries. He notes that not only the magnitude of the
effects but also their timing supports the trade hypoth-
esis, and that cross-country variation indicates that
countries with larger increases in Southern import
competition have experienced a decline in the relative
position of unskilled workers.
Wood bases these conclusions on a comparison of
the observed demand for labor in developed countries
to what it would have been had developing countries
not become the site of production for an increased
share of manufactured goods consumed in developed
countries.5 He estimates that the cumulative effect of
manufacturing trade patterns through 1990 was to
increase the demand for skilled (educated) labor in the
North, relative to unskilled labor, by 5.5 percent. But
two factors omitted from the analysis could quadruple
this estimate, according to Wood. First, manufacturers
in developed countries have reacted to foreign com-
petition by devising production techniques that use
less unskilled labor. Second, trade has also reduced
the demand for unskilled labor in service-producing
sectors, both because they supply intermediate inputs
to domestic manufacturers and because they partici-
pate directly in international trade.
The manufacturing sector is
relatively small--less than 20
percent of U.S. employment in
recent years--and only a subset
of these jobs have been
directly threatened by trade.
Other writers acknowledge that international
competition has reduced the demand for manufactur-
ing production workers in the United States, and that
the timing of international trade patterns accords well
with the rise in earnings inequality. (For example, see
Sachs and Shatz 1994.) But generally they hesitate to
attribute a major role to international trade in explain-
ing trends in earnings inequality. The recent literature
on this topic has been summarized in thoughtful
(albeit somewhat skeptical) reviews by Burtless (1995),
Fieleke (1994), and Freeman (1995).6
One issue is that the manufacturing sector is
relatively small, accounting for less than 20 percent
of U.S. employment in recent years. Only a subset
s Wood starts by examining the skill and labor content of the
imported goods, but then modifies the estimates in light of the fact
that different relative prices in developed countries would lead
them to use a different mix of inputs, and because a higher price for
these goods (were they produced in developed countries) would
lead to a reduction in demand for them.
6 These reviews also cover recent volumes edited by Bhagwati
and Kosters (1994) and Bergstrand, Cosimano, Houck, and Sheehan
(1994).
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Moreover, at least some of the increase in international
trade has been with developed countries with high
wages, limiting the extent to which one would expect
U.S. wages to adjust downward.
Second, the theory predicts that trade should
change the relative output prices of low-skill and
high-skill manufactured goods. That is, in the United
States, we should expect to see a decline in the rela-
tive price of non-skill-intensive, import-competing
goods. (In fact, it is this price decline that would cause
a drop in U.S. wages.) The evidence on this prediction
is mixed. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) do not find
that relative prices of goods that use production labor
relatively intensively have declined in the United
States. (Instead, their study tends to support the
technology hypothesis, as they find that total factor
productivity--their proxy for technology--rose more
rapidly in industries that used nonproduction workers
more intensively.) On the other hand, Sachs and Shatz
(1994) use an alternative price series to show support
for the trade theory.
Another issue concerns trends in other industries.
The release of manufacturing production workers to
other sectors should not only have lowered the earn-
ings of other, relatively less educated workers (as it
did), but also caused other sectors to increase their use
of such workers. Instead, they reduced their demand.
Technological change. A third explanation for the
rising earnings premium for college-educated workers
is that there has been a general shift in demand in
favor of workers with relatively high intellectual as
opposed to manual ability. The growing use of com-
puters is thought to have contributed to this phenom-
enon. To a large degree, the conclusion that technol-
ogy matters is the result of observing that the earnings
distribution has widened in a broad range of indus-
tries, and that investment in technology across indus-
tries appears correlated with earnings premia for
college graduates.
The Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and
Lawrence aud Slaughter (1993) studies mentioned
above are examples of recent research supporting a
role for technology. In addition, Brauer and Hickok
(1994) examine average pay changes for workers with
different levels of educational attainment in 46 indus-
tries for the period 1979-89. According to Brauer and
Hickok, industry investment in high tech capital such
as computers and communication equipment plus
overall capital deepening accounted for 60 percent of
the explained variation in pay trends for college
graduates versus high school dropouts. In agreement
with the general findings of Murphy and Welch
(1993a) and Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994),
shifts in the demand for the output of different indus-
tries was the next most important factor, accounting
for about 30 percent of the explained variation. Inter-
national trade was found to play a lesser role, and
contrary to the usual argument, trade with developed
countries appeared to play as much of a role as trade
with developing countries. Brauer (1995) has extended
this mode of analysis to trends across states. This
research also indicates a greater role for technology
than for trade in explah~ing the growing premium for
a college degree, particularly when the regressions are
extended to include the early 1990s.
Employer decisions with respect to training may
have exacerbated the tendency of technology to cause
incomes to become less equal over time. Most of the
workers who receive employer-provided trah~ing are
technical and managerial workers who have a college
degree. Lynch (1994) has estimated that only 4 percent
of young workers without a college degree receive
formal training at their workplace, and this fraction is
lower than in other industrialized countries.
While a growing body of research suggests that
technology has caused an increase in the relative pay
for college graduates, some questions remain. Howell
(1993, 1994) finds that the demand for high-end work-
ers rose before computer usage became widespread
in the workplace, and he concludes that institutional
and organizational changes have been more influen-
tial than technology in affecting relative earnings.
More generally, further research is needed on the
ramifications of specific types of technological change,
as the studies mentioned thus far mostly use very
general measures of the state of technology. Some
further discussion of preliminary microeconomic in-
vestigations is found in a later section.
h~stitutional h~fluences on Relative
Ea~,ffngs by Educational Attainment
Aside from shifts in labor supply and labor de-
mand, the more competitive and more conservative
social attitudes of the 1980s may have contributed to
inequality. To lend support to this argument, research-
ers have pointed to changes in the role of wage-setting
institutions that traditionally have protected the
wages of lower-paid (and, typically, less educated)
workers. Recent studies have focused on declines in
the real value of the minimum wage and in unioniza-
tion. Institutional differences in how wages are deter-
mined may help to explain why h~equality has in-
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other industrialized countries, since demand-side ex-
planations apply similarly across countries.
The U.S. minimum wage remained unchanged in
nominal terms throughout most of the 1980s. Horrigan
and Mincy (1993) simulate what would have hap-
pened to earnings inequality had the minimum wage
kept pace with inflation. They find only modest effects
for workers with different levels of education (and
slightly more noticeable effects on the earnings differ-
ences between older and younger workers, and on
workers in high- and low-status occupations). They
Aside from shifts in labor supply
and labor demand, the more
competitive and more conservative
social attitudes of the 1980s may
have contributed to inequality.
caution, moreover, that the adjustment of the mini-
mum wage would have had virtually no effect on
inequality as measured by family income, because
of the attenuated relationship between low wages
and low family income. That is, some minimum wage
earners live in poor families while others live in
well-to-do families.
From 1969 to 1978, the share of the nonagricul-
tural work force organized in unions in the United
States fell from 29 to 25 percent; over the 1980s, the
share plummeted to 16 percent. The drop-off in union-
ization was particularly sharp among younger (that is,
25- to 34-year-old) men ~vho had only a high school
education or held blue-collar jobs. Freeman (1993)
examines pay differentials between unionized and
non-unionized workers, as well as pay changes for
workers who changed union status during the 1980s.
He concludes that the decline in unionization explains
at least 15 percent, and perhaps as much as 40 percent,
of the growing disparity bet~veen wages for college-
educated and tzigh school-educated workers. In a
similar vein, Card (1992) finds that changes in union-
ization account for one-fifth of the increase in the
between-quintile variance of adult male ~vages be-
tween 1973 and 1987. His study controls for education,
experience, and race, as well as considering whether
workers joining unions are similar in "ability" to their
nonunionized peers.
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1995) consider the
influence of both the minimum wage and unioniza-
tion, as well as supply and demand factors, during the
1980s. They generally find that institutions are quite
important for younger workers. For young men (that
is, those with less than 10 years of experience), the
minimun~ wage and unionization in combination ex-
plain 32 percent of the growing disparity in earnings
for college versus high-school graduates--compared
to 42 percent for supply and demand (with the re-
mainder unexplained). For young women, the institu-
tional factors (mostly the minimum wage) explain 16
percent. For older men and women, institutions be-
come relatively less important in explaining educa-
tion-based wage differences, although for men with at
least 20 years of work experience unions continue to
explain 18 percent of differential earnings trends.
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux emphasize that, what-
ever the explanatory power of institutions in the
aggregate, they are important for particular subcate-
gories within the earnings distribution. For example,
the lack of indexing of the minimum wage had a
sizable impact on lo~v earners. Moreover, they stress
that the effects are greater ~vhen earnings of part-time
workers are also considered.
A growing body of research examines institutions
from an international perspective. Most, if not all,
advanced countries have been subject to sin~ilar influ-
ences in terms of sectoral shifts, globalization, and
technological change. Gottschalk and Joyce (1992), for
example, estimate that a remarkably similar redistri-
bution of employment across sectors has occurred in a
number of industrialized countries. Yet the mecha-
nisms by ~vlzich wages get set differ greatly (Freeman
and Katz 1994). In general, wage-setting systems in
Continental Europe are far more centralized than in
the United States. Freeman and Katz provide the
following examples: "In Austria and Sweden... peak-
level union confederations and employer federations
have historically bargained for national wage settle-
ments that cover much of the work force but allow
local employers and unions to increase wages above
the national settlement through ’wage drift.’ In Ger-
many industry or regional collective bargaining deter-
mines basic wages for an area and the Ministry of
Labor often extends those to all workers. In France the
minimum wage is important in determining the over-
all level of wages, and the French Mi~zistry of Labor
also extends contracts. In Italy the Scala Mobile, a form
of negotiated wage increase designed to compensate
for inflation and which applied effectively to all Ital-
ians, increased the pay of low-paid workers faster
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(pp. 51-52). Furthermore, the United States--along
with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
France--experienced a more precipitous drop in
tmionization during the 1980s than other advanced
countries.
In light of these institutional patterns, it is not
surprising that the largest overall increases in inequal-
ity occurred in the United States and the United
Kh~gdom. In addition, Freeman and Katz note that the
largest relative decline in the position of low-wage
workers occurred in the United States.
These findings are not without controversy, how-
ever. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1995) offer two criti-
cisms. First, it is hard to quantify the extent to which
wages are set by institutions. Different measures rank
countries somewhat differently, depending on which
characteristics of the wage-setting mechanisms receive
greater weight. Second, studies err on the side of
explaining wage trends by institutions because they
do not distinguish between levels and changes. In
particular, in a country with strong but weakening
institutions, these institutions could be used to ratio-
nalize either stability or greater dispersion in wages.
Alternative Explanations: Some Further Thoughts
Most analysts now concede that no one factor is
responsible for the rising education wage premium.
At a Federal Reserve Bmxk of New York conference on
this topic, the participants h~dicated in a vote that they
believed 60 percent of rish~g inequality among educa-
tional attainment categories has been due to technol-
ogy, 10 percent to international trade, and 30 percent
to other factors--including immigration, a low mini-
mum wage, and changes in wage-setth~g institutions
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1995). Indeed, it is
striking that so many factors have apparently com-
bined to stretch out the distribution of earnings.
Furthermore, it is diffficult--if not impossible--to
determine exactly how important a single explanation
is because the various explanations are to some extent
interlinked. International competition and technolog-
ical change have caused some industries to decline
and others to expand in relative importance. More-
over, technological change and union strength are not
entirely exogenous; some investments undoubtedly
have taken place under the threat of international
competition, and international competition may have
been responsible for the changing influence of unions.
When different explanations are correlated in an
econometric study, their relative effects may be
masked. On the other hand, a study that examines
only one explanation may exaggerate its influence, to
the extent that other relevant (and correlated) factors
are omitted.
Changing Returns to Experience
Along with higher returns to education, recent
research has found evidence of higher returns to work
experience. That is, older workers are being paid
relatively more compared to yom~ger workers (Figure
3). The trends vary somewhat between men and
women, however, and they seem not to apply as
clearly to the oldest workers. According to the U.S.
Department of Labor (1994), men with less than 20
years of potential experience in the work force suf-
fered a real decline h~ average earnings of close to 7
percent between 1979 and 1992.7 Men with at least 30
years of potential experience averaged a decline of less
Along with higher returns to
education, recent research
has found evidence of higher
returns to work experience.
than 3 percent, while those with 20 to 29 years of
potential experience had no decline. Among women,
the earnings of middle-aged workers (that is, women
with 10 to 29 years of potential experience) rose by
much more than those of younger or older workers.
As noted above, it appears that institutional sto-
ries apply more strongly to younger workers--that
is, their relative wages have fallen as a result of a
reduction in the real value of the minimum wage and
in unionization. But, in contrast to the proliferation of
studies on education, research on the changing returns
to experience is not all that extensive.
One important preliminary question is the degree
to ~vhich the observed wage trends for older and
younger workers reflect a cohort effect rather than
experience. That is, if the quality of education has
fallen over time (as declining college board scores
7 Potential experience is defined as age minus years of school-
ing minus six. The statistics refer to annual earnings of full-time
year-round workers.
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Earnings Ratios of Workers zoith Various Levels of Potential
Experiencea versus Those zoith Less than 10 Years of Experience






















Men Women      0 Men    Women
Potential experience is defined as age minus years of schooling minus six.










0 Men    Women
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1994). Annual figures computed for year-round, full4ime workers.
would tend to indicate), younger workers would be
expected to fall behind, even if the marginal return to
experience remained constant. Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993) tend to discount this theory, since they
fh~d that the rise in the education premium has been
age neutral. Still, this remains an area for further
research. For one thing, to the extent that rapid
technological change has been important in driving
wages, older workers might be expected to be disad-
vantaged. The rising premium paid to older workers
could conceivably be the net outcome of offsetting
cohort and technology effects.
Changing Returns to Skill and Other
Aspects of Earnings Inequality
The distribution of earnings of persons with sim-
ilar educational backgrounds and years of experience
also has widened. The literature on inequality has
dubbed tlzis the "within-group" trend. Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce (1993) estimate that within-group inequal-
ity has been increasing since 1970--well before the
rising returns to education and experience. They also
find that within-group inequal-
ity is highly significant. Over the
1964-89 period, 44 percent of
the overall rise in inequality as
measured by the difference be-
t~veen incomes at the 90th and
10th percentiles is due to trends
across education and experience
groups and 56 percent to trends
within groups.
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
conclude that the trend in ~vith-
in-group inequality reflects a ris-
ing demand for skills that are
possessed to different degrees
by different workers, since em-
ployment has shifted toward in-
dustries and occupations that
employ skilled workers even in
the face of rising relative wages.
By contrast, they find little evi-
dence that the rise in inequality
is due to grooving diversity in
the extent of skills possessed by
different workers. These skills,
which presumably are observ-
able to individual employers,
are not yet well understood by
researchers. Nor are the reasons for the increased
returns to skill. The Levy-Murnane (1992) assessment
that within-group inequality is the "most important
unresolved puzzle" about earnings trends remains
valid, even though we now know more than we did
then.
This section reviews studies that attempt specifi-
cally to explain the rise in within-group inequality,
as well as some more general studies of inequality that
do not focus specifically on differences by education
and experience. As in Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, the
term "skill" is used here to refer to ability that is not
measured by years of education and experience, even
though some authors use "skill" either synonymously
with these other aspects of ability (particularly educa-
tion) or as a catchall for all aspects of ability (such as
when higher wages are taken as evidence of higher
skills). In an attempt to expand our knowledge be-
yond the studies reviewed here, Peter Cappelli’s pa-
per for this symposium explores the characteristics of
technology or work organization that are contributing
to rising skill requirements for individual employers,
and then examines how these skill requirements are
reflected in ;vages paid. Richard Freeman’s paper
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are responsible for greater earnings inequality.
Uneven Impacts of Structural Change
A possible reason for increased within-group
inequality is that broad changes in the mix of indus-
tries or occupations inevitably have a more direct
effect on some workers than others. For example,
workers who are laid off during a period of structural
change find it difficult to obtain comparably paid jobs,
which would tend to increase differences within a
given gronp in the work force. Or if the number of
"bad jobs" is expanding rapidly, a growing number of
recent college graduates may be working in positions
for which they are overeducated (while others in this
education category are more fortunate in their job
search). Tyler, Murnane, and Levy (1995) address
these topics by asking whether growing numbers of
college graduates are taking jobs that pay high school
A frequently mentioned
hypothesis about within-group
inequality is that technological
change is increasing the
dernand for skill.
wages. In general, they dispel this hypothesis. The
percentage of college graduates with "high-school
jobs" fell during the 1980s. By exception, however, the
authors estimate that almost 18 percent of college-
educated men aged 45 to 54 were in "high-school
jobs" in 1989, up from less than 15 percent in 1979.8
Thus business restructuring appears to have contrib-
uted to greater earnings disparities for this group.
Another aspect of the same theme is that struc-
tural change is more pervasive for minority groups or
for individuals in certain geograplzic locations. Bound
and Freeman (1991) examine the rising gap in earnings
between young black and young white men with
similar educational backgrounds from the mid 1970s
through the 1980s. The authors find that different
economic forces affected different groups of young
blacks. In addition to declines in the minimum wage,
unionization, and manufacturing jobs, the economic
decline in inner cities was found to affect blacks with
a high school degree or less--particularly in the Mid-
west. College graduates, however, did not appear to
be affected by geographic factors. By contrast with the
Bound-Freeman study, Acs and Danziger (1993) find
that low-earning blacks were harmed by a loss of
manufacturing jobs, regardless of whether they lived
in Northern inner cities or in other locations.9
Technology and Workplace Organization
As indicated above, a frequently mentioned hy-
pothesis about within-group h~equality is that techno-
logical change is increasing the demand for skill.
Research by Cappelli (1993) suggests that the relation-
ship between technology and skills may be quite
complicated, however. Cappelli examined production
workers in a variety of industries using a sample of
employers from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. He
measured skill requirements using an evaluation sys-
tem developed by Hay Associates that attempts to
capture the autonomy and complexity of jobs. The
study found mixed results concerning the role of
technology. In manufacturing, individual production
jobs required more skill over time, and the mix shifted
toward jobs with higher skill requirements. If these
changes did not systematically favor production
workers with more (or less) education or experience,
Cappelli’s findings are consistent with rising within-
group inequality.~o
Cappelli found that so-called upskilling of man-
ufacturing jobs was not driven prhnarily by the im-
plementation of specific technologies such as numeri-
cally controlled machines. Rather it seemed to be
related to new management views concerning how
jobs should be redesigned, as well as to a decline in
union power that made their implementation possible.
For clerical work, by contrast, changes in skill require-
ments were related to the introduction of new office
technologies, such as word processors and personal
computers. Technology had idiosyncratic effects on
job requirements, increasing the skill requirements for
some and decreasing them for others.
In another study, Scott, O’Shaughnessy, and Cap-
pelli (1994) find that insurance companies have been
8 Note that this finding conflicts with the generally reported
increase in returns to work experience.
9 Several papers in today’s symposium address the role of
spatial determinants of inequality within a metropolitan area, with
a subset of these also indicating how employment opportunities
vary by location.
~0 If the favored workers were more highly educated or more
experienced, the results are consistent with the above-noted cross-
group trends. Cappelli did not specifically address the issue of
whether skills are correlated with education or experience.
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level managerial jobs are becoming more scarce, but
managers’ span of control is becoming greater (since a
higher fraction of jobs are at lower levels). As a
consequence, the payoff to attaining a high-level job
has increased.
Research by Osterman (1995) indicates that train-
ing practices vary substantially across workplaces.
Business establistm~ents that introduce so-called high
performance work organizations, that have more "hu-
manistic" values, and whose employees have union
representation are relatively more likely to provide
training for their workers. While Osterman’s research
stops short of examining the link between training and
Training practices vary
substantially across workplaces,




pay over time, it does indicate that employers do not
react uniformly to economywide influences such as
technological change. Future studies of earnings in-
equality may profitably continue to examine the di-
versity in employer decision-making.
Wage-Setting hlstitutions
Research on the role of labor market institutions
suggests that the declining roles of centralized bar-
gaining and of the minimum wage have given em-
ployers more freedom to adjust wages in light of the
demands of the workplace. Employers may also have
become more inclined in recent years to vary pay to
reflect performance for their nonunionized workers.
Freeman (1993) found that, in addition to boost-
ing the wages of their members relative to nonunion-
ized workers, unions tend to reduce the dispersion of
earnings within workplaces. Therefore, a declh~e in
unionization could lead to greater within-group in-
equality. The evidence indicates, however, that in-
equality of earnings rose roughly as rapidly among
union as among nonunion workers between 1978 and
1988. Freeman indicates that this is the result of
diminished power of unions in the 1980s, as evidenced
by the breakdown of pattern bargaining and the
frequency of wage concessions.
Examining almost the same time period as Free-
man, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1995) concur that
unionization is of very limited significance in explain-
ing rising within-group inequality. But they attribute
24 percent of the increase in within-group inequality
among men, and 34 percent among women, to the
drop in the real minimum wage.
Evidence of a link between changing pay prac-
tices for professional and managerial workers and
increased inequality is still unavailable. Groshen
(1993) examines increasing inequality among nonpro-
duction workers, using a Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland survey of employers in its district. She finds
that changes in human resource management prac-
tices, such as linking pay more closely to performance,
were not helpful in explaining growing salary differ-
ences in the 1980s.
The Relationship between Unemployment,
Underemployment, and Inequality
Virtually all of the studies cited so far are limited
to individuals with positive earnings. Many of them
are restricted to full-time workers or those working
a certain number of hours or weeks per year. These
adjustments make sense in order to help isolate the
causes of growing inequality. But if different groups in
the population have different trends with respect to
hours worked, these differences could serve to rein-
force or offset inequality based on rates of pay.
The evidence suggests that the secular decline
in demand for less-skilled workers has resulted in a
decrease in both their relative rate of pay and their
relative number of hours worked. Topel (1993) finds
that the largest declines in wage rates between 1967
and 1989 have occurred for groups for which unem-
ployment and nonparticipation in the work force have
increased the most. Furthermore, virtually all of the
long-term increase in joblessness has occurred among
low-wage men. Havelnan and Buron (1994) conclude
that the decline in horn’s worked by low earners
(which includes working part-year, part-time, or not
at all) plays a large role in the increase in earnings
inequality.1~
~ The authors indicate that some previous studies underesti-
mated the role of hours worked by choosing a business cycle peak
as the starting date for their analysis.
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institutions in many European countries effectively
put a floor on the income earned by those with
relatively low wages. If such constraints were intro-
duced in the United States, economic theory suggests
that unemployment and underemployment of low
earners would increase even more. Indeed, empirical
work indicates that unemployment is highest in Euro-
pean countries among low earners. But income in-
equality is smaller than in the United States because of
social welfare programs (Freeman 1994).
The Issue of Permanent Earnings Inequality
The findings on inequality have been interpreted
as showing that the poor have become relatively
poorer over thne, while the rich have gotten richer.
But, in fact, the data come from cross sections of
workers, rather than tracking of individuals over time.
If everyone’s income merely became more variable
over time, then the data would show greater inequal-
ity, but it would not be true that low earners were
falling farther behind high earners.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) use panel data for
the 1970s and 1980s to distinguish trends in mean
income.from variation around mean income for indi-
vidual workers. They find that the permanent and the
transitory components of the variance of earnings
each increased by 40 percent. Therefore the perception
of the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer
is correct--although the change may not be quite as
dramatic as had been thought. As for the transitory
component, which heretofore had not been studied,
Gottschalk and Moffitt find tliat earnings of union
workers and those employed h~ manufacturing fluc-
tuate less than earnings of nonunion workers and
those in service-producing industries. However, de-
unionization and industrial shifts together explain
only 12 percent of the increase in wage instability from
the 1970s to the 1980s. Thus, the authors conclude that
further research is needed on the sources of transitory
income variability.
From h~equality in Ea~,~ings to
Inequality in Living Standards
Rising inequality in earnings might be viewed as
a relatively minor issue if other factors acted to
equalize living standards. But, to the contrary, re-
search has shown decisively that in the United States
additional influences generally served to reinforce the
growing inequality in earnings. Some of these factors
are related to the labor market, while others relate to
social trends and the role of government.
In contrast to six other major industrialized coun-
tries (Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom), the United States
had a greater increase in family income inequality
than in earnings inequality during the 1980s (Gott-
schalk 1993). For example, the extent of increase in
earnings inequality among prime-aged males in the
United States and Canada was about the same, but
Canada experienced no clear trend in family income
inequality as the Lorenz curve shifted in for lower
quhatiles and out for upper quintiles (Blackburn and
Bloom 1993).
One reason for the difference may relate to family
structure and associated changes in family work effort.
We have evidence on how these factors influenced
inequality in the United States without a parallel
understanding for other countries. In a comprehensive
examination of disparities in the United States, Brad-
bury (1996) finds that the number of workers per
family and hours per worker fell for the poorest
quintile and rose for the richest quintile between 1979
and 1993.~2 The United States experienced an increase
in female-headed families and ha individuals living
alone during the 1980s, but Blackburn and Bloom
report that Canada did not. Finally, men and women
with high earnings in the United States increasingly
have tended to marry someone in a similar, rather
than a lower, earnings bracket (Murphy and Welch
1993b).~3
The second reason for the particularly sharp in-
crease in family income inequality in the United States
is that decreasing transfer payments and a change in
tax structure reinforced the growing disparities in
earnings. In Canada, by contrast, public assistance
and general social expenditures increased in the 1980s
(Blackburn and Bloom 1993; Gramlich, Kasten, and
Sammartino 1993; Gottschalk 1993).
~2 As was true for individuals, earnings per hour fell for
the poorest quintile and rose for the richest quintile of familiies.
Bradbu~T (1996) indicates this was the most important factor
explaining the trend in fanLily income inequality.
The a~a~lable studies d~sagree abont the effect of the in-
creased tendency of wives to participate in the paid labor force.
Murphy and Welch suggest that this trend has led to greater
disparities among family incomes since the wife’s income is no
longer inversely related to that of her husband. However, Cancian,
Danziger, and Gottschalk (1993) find that family income inequality
in the United States WotLld have increased to an even greater extent
over the past 20 years were it not for the increased earnings of
wives--especially among black families.
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United States are provided largely at the discretion of
individual employers rather than being universal.
Little (1995) finds that benefit coverage became less
equal in the 1980s.
Finally, looking at the trends of the past several
decades in the United States, the 1980s were unique in
the relative gains of the rich (Karoly 1993). Presum-
ably, this trend relates to growth in income from
capital relative to other sources.
Historically, growth has increased job opportuni-
ties for the poor more than for the rich. Given strong
macroeconomic growth during much of the decade,
the 1980s should have been a period of declining
poverty in the United States, all else equal. Instead, the
poverty rate rose from 13.6 percent in 1989 to 15.2
percent in 1991. Blank and Card (1993) attribute this
increase in poverty to the fact that rising wage in-
equality and other trends more than offset positive
macroeconomic developments. Bradbury (1996) finds
that New England, which experienced an economic
boom of unusual proportions in the 1980s, was the
only region of the country in which the average
income of the bottom fifth of families rose during the
1980s, thus indicating that sufficiently strong growth is
still able to help the poor.
Conclusions
As studies have increasingly demonstrated the
pervasive nature of the rise in earnings inequality,
researchers have become more willing to acknowl-
edge that many aspects of labor markets have contrib-
uted to the observed trends in the United States. On
the supply side, a decrease in the rate of growth of
college graduates and an influx of relatively unedu-
cated immigrants help to explain higher returns to
education. On the demand side, changes in industrial
structure, international trade, and technology all ap-
pear to play a role. In addition, wage-setting institu-
tions may cause certain workers to be paid more or
less than what the market would indicate. These
institutions have changed over tin~e, in ways that have
accentuated inequality. Distinguishing the individual
effects of different influences remains problematic,
however, and may vary with the time period exam-
ined and the particular aspect of earnings inequality
trader examination.
Even as a consensus appears to be building that
the rise in inequality has been multi-faceted, some
puzzles remain. The papers and discussions at this
symposium address such gaps in our knowledge, and
their findings are particularly relevant as discussions
of inequality turn to possible remedies.
One important question is whether the return to
education will continue to increase in the future, given
the widespread perception that the U.S. economy is
generating many low-quality jobs. If the wage pre-
mium for college graduates is expected to hold con-
stant or rise further, then discussions of new policies
One important question is
whether the return to education
will continue to increase in
the flzture, given the widespread
perception that the U.S.
economy is generating many
low-quality jobs.
to augment the supply of educated workers take on
greater urgency than if market forces (such as higher
college enrollments in response to observed higher
earnings) cause the wage premium to decline.
An increasing body of evidence indicates that
new workplace technologies are resulting in higher
wages for skilled workers (where the concept of skills
goes beyond what can be measured by years of
education or experience), and that this phenomenon
has played an hnportant role in creating wider wage
disparities. Yet relatively little is known about how
technology influences skill requirements and what can
be done to raise the average skill levels of the work
force.
Another outstanding puzzle is the extent to which
the trend toward inequality can be reversed through
reform of U.S. wage-setting insfitutions. The role of
unions and the real value of the minimum wage have
been allowed to erode over time. Furthermore, start-
ing in the 1980s reforms of taxes and transfers have
tended to reinforce rather than offset the impact of
labor market contributions to inequality. If the tradi-
tional tools to redistribute income have been neglected
in the United States, what can this country learn from
foreign experiences and what new institutional op-
tions are available?
A final issue is the cost of earnings inequality.
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consequences inequality has for macroeconomic per-
formance. Evidence suggests that greater equality in
Europe, as compared with the United States, has come
at the expense of employment growth. On the other
hand, concern is mounting that the United States
cannot remain competitive if college-educated work-
ers continue to command higher and higher pay, and
if labor skills demanded at high-teclmology work-
places are in short supply.
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